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We use recent matched employer-employee data to directly investigate if white workers
have a taste for racial discrimination in Britain. Based on a new structural model with
individual and ﬁrm heterogeneity, we develop and test two predictions. Firstly, white
employees with a taste for discrimination should report lower levels of job satisfaction the
larger the proportion of ethnic minorities at their workplace. Secondly, white employees
would have to be compensated by higher wages if required to work alongside ethnic minor-
ity co-workers. Both hypotheses are clearly supported for white males in our data, after
comprehensively controlling for individual, job, and workplace characteristics. However,
the evidence is weaker for females. The white male wage premium for working amongst
only ethnic minority co-workers, as compared to working only with whites, is about 12%.
Importantly, it appears that neither of these eﬀects operates via realised racial prejudice
at the workplace or white employees’ feelings concerning their job security.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the seminal studies by Gary Becker (1957, 1971), issues surrounding the existence,
extent and persistence of discrimination in the labour market, and more widely in the legal
system, ﬁnancial markets, housing, education and other public services, have generated
an enormous amount of interest by economists and social scientists. Recent informative
reviews of both the theoretical and empirical economics literature in this area can be
found in Cain (1986), Darity and Mason (1998), Altonji and Blank (1999) and Riach and
Rich (2002). Of all the possible grounds for discrimination, for example with respect to
gender, race, disability, age or sexual preference, perhaps the most emotive branch of this
literature regards unequal treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity. According to Arrow
(1998), even after three or four decades of equal opportunities legislation in many countries
including the US, such discrimination still ’pervades every aspect of a society in which it
is found’. In the labour market this has been shown to apply to employment prospects,
the receipt of employer-provided training, the probability of being promoted and wages
(Altonji and Blank, 1999). However, it is clearly evident that the most blatant forms of
racial discrimination such as forced or legalised racial segregation in labour markets and
public services are no longer prevalent in developed countries (Arrow, 1998; Altonji and
Blank, 1999).
Recent decades have seen a great deal of theoretical work concerned with the possible
mechanisms via which individuals from diﬀerent racial or ethnic minority backgrounds can
be observed earning diﬀerent amounts, even at the same productivity level. Following the
theoretical advancements of Becker (1957, 1971), a core explanation for racial discrimina-
tion is based on economic agents having a taste or preference against other groups, which
can be held by employers, employees, consumers or the government. A recent new angle
to this literature concerns the importance of identity. For example, Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) directly include identity into the utility function, which then leads individuals to
be prepared to suﬀer loss of income in order to discriminate against other groups. Frijters
(1998) models the emergence of group identity itself as the outcome of rational individuals
attempting to monopolise rents. Group identity then, ex post, implies discrimination of
[1]the group that lost the competition over scarce rents.
In contrast, virtually all other explanations for observed racial diﬀerentials are non-
preference based, with theories based on ’statistical’ or information-based discrimination
being the most prominent (see, for example, Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Altonji and
Pierret, 2001; Knowles et al., 2001). Statistical discrimination can work through, for ex-
ample, employers believing there is something wrong with the discriminated group, such
as a higher probability of women leaving the labour market (Polachek, 1995), greater
diﬃculty in observing the quality of the workers, or a comparative advantage in a dif-
ferent ﬁeld of activity (e.g. Becker, 1991; Lazear and Rosen, 1990). A second class of
statistical discrimination models explains discrimination as a self-fulﬁlling prophesy (e.g.
Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993; Kremer, 1993; Lang, 1986; Farmer and Terell, 1996),
whereby low expectations of the average productivity of a group lead individuals to un-
dertake actions which make the expectation come true, such as making lower investments
in human capital (Kremer, 1993), or applying for jobs for which one is not suited (Ros´ en,
1997). Weaker versions of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy argument suggest that persistence
in expectations of diﬀerential productivity lead groups to segregate into diﬀerent occupa-
tions or human capital levels, thereby perpetuating initial disadvantages (e.g. Breen and
Garcia, 2002).
However, empirically distinguishing between these competing explanations remains
very diﬃcult (see Heckman, 1998), and consequently there is no dominant view about
how racial discrimination perpetuates itself in the labour market. The ability to correctly
identify the causal mechanisms by which racial discrimination occurs and persists is,
however, crucial for designing and introducing the appropriate policy response (Neumark,
1999; Bayard et al., 2003).
Whilst the majority of the empirical literature stems from the US, recent years have
seen a number of papers focusing on racial or ethnic minority discrimination in the British
labour market. Racism continues to be a prominent political issue in Britain, with recent
attention focused on the existence of ’institutional racism’ in large private corporations,
such as Ford, and in the public sector, including the National Health Service, the police
and the armed forces. For example, Shields and Wheatley Price (2002a, 2002b) document
[2]that the majority of ethnic minority nursing staﬀ report having experienced racial ha-
rassment from co-workers and also show that frequent episodes of this form of employee
discrimination have the largest detrimental impact of their job satisfaction. Further ev-
idence of racially prejudiced attitudes in Britain is provided by Dustmann and Preston
(2001). Using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey they found that 20% of the
white respondents would mind if their boss was from an ethnic minority, 38% reported
being at least a little prejudiced against people of other races and 53% would mind if
a close relative married someone from an ethnic minority. Interestingly, the strength of
these racial hostility indicators increased with the concentration of ethnic minorities in the
neighbourhood. Furthermore, it appears that it is racial prejudice, rather than economic
fears (e.g. over job security), which dominates concerns about the impact of immigration
in Britain (Dustmann and Preston, 2002; see Borjas, 1999, more generally).
In common with studies for other countries, employer discrimination, based on tastes,
is typically taken as the dominant explanation for racial or ethnic disadvantage in the
British labour market. Moreover, in contrast to the case of gender (Blackaby et al., 1997;
Tzannatos, 1988), it is widely accepted that the equal opportunities legislation succes-
sively introduced in Britain since the Race Relations Act of 1976, has been less successful
in reducing racial diﬀerentials in the labour market, with ethnic minorities becoming in-
creasingly concentrated in the lower percentiles of the pay distribution (Blackaby et al.,
1994, 2002). Numerous studies have found evidence of more limited employment prospects
(e.g. Blackaby et al., 1997, 1998, 2002), fewer training and promotion opportunities (e.g.
Pudney and Shields, 2000a, 2000b), and lower occupational attainment (e.g. Stewart,
1983) and wages (e.g. Blackaby et al., 1998, 2002; Dustmann and Fabri, 2003) for ethnic
minority groups, compared to similar white workers in Britain. However, these ﬁndings
constitute, at best, only indirect evidence of the extent and nature of discrimination.
In this paper we aim to contribute more direct evidence of the extent of racial dis-
crimination at the workplace, using, recently collected, matched employer-employee data
from Britain, which uniquely allows us to establish the racial or ethnic composition of
workplaces. The detailed data also provides i n f o r m a t i o no nw o r k e r sj o bs a t i s f a c t i o na n d
wages, together with a wide range of workplace characteristics with which we attempt
[3]to comprehensively capture heterogeneity in the quality of the job and the general work-
ing environment. Our particular focus is on identifying if white employees have a taste
for discrimination against their ethnic minority co-workers. Of all the competing the-
ories of racial discrimination, there are relatively very few studies that have attempted
to explore whether such employee tastes exist (for example, see the limited number of
studies mentioned in the recent reviews noted above). However, one notable exception is
Chiswick (1973) who, using state-level variation in racial density in the US, found that
white employee discrimination was important in explaining racial diﬀerentials in wages.
In particular, white workers of a given skill level were found to receive compensation in
the form of higher weekly wages if they worked with non-whites.
To justify our empirical analysis we expand Becker’s theoretical model of employee
discrimination to include both worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The theory provides two
clear predictions that we empirically test. Firstly, if white employees truly have a taste
for discrimination, then their job satisfaction will be lower, the higher the concentration
of ethnic minority co-workers. Secondly, we should also observe higher pay for white
employees, working amongst higher concentrations of ethnic minority co-workers, as a
compensating diﬀerential. Furthermore, our detailed workplace data enables us to delve
deeper into the actual mechanisms by which discriminatory tastes manifest themselves. In
particular, since managers report if there have been racial tensions at their workplace, we
can address the question of whether it is merely the presence of ethnic minority co-workers
that bothers white employees, or whether it is the racial tension itself that is the cause
of an unhappy working environment. Similarly, by using self-reported information on
job-insecurity, we explore whether it is the impact of ethnic minority co-workers on white
workers’ perceptions of job (in)security that gives rise to a taste for racial discrimination.
In using matched employer-employee data we also contribute to the recent literature
that has used such data to obtain a better understanding of the workings of the labour
market (see Abowd and Kramarz, 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Hamermesh, 1999).
Most of these studies have used US data from the Worker-Establishment Characteristics
Database (WECD) and a matching of the SampleE d i t e dD e t a i lF i l e( S E D F )t oe s t a b l i s h -
ment records in the 1990 Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL). Of the small
[4]literature that has focused on sex and racial discrimination three recent examples are
Carrington and Troske (1998), Hellerstein and Neumark (2002) and Bayard et al. (2003).
The latter study found that segregation of women in lower-paying occupations, industries
and establishments accounted for around half of the gender wage gap. Importantly, with
respect to the analysis presented in this paper, Carrington and Troske (1998) found that
the inter-ﬁrm distribution of black and white workers was close to that implied by ran-
dom assignment. They also cite evidence that black and white workers in the same ﬁrm
often have diﬀerent skills, and that the black-white wage gap in the US is primarily a
within-ﬁrm phenomenon. Hellerstein and Neumark (2002) use new data from the new
Decennial Employer-Employee Dataset (DEED) and ﬁnd that Hispanics, but not white
workers, suﬀer wage penalties from employment in a workplace with a large share of
Hispanic workers.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we build on the model of Becker
(1957, 1971) by presenting two formal theories of discrimination, via which we can struc-
turally estimate the presence of employee tastes for racial discrimination. Importantly,
we expand the basic model to include both worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The matched
employer-employer data we use, which uniquely contains information about the racial or
ethnic composition of the workplace, is described in Section 3, together with the deriva-
tion of our main variables of interest. Section 4 outlines the empirical models we use to
test the two main predictions of the theory. The results from these models are discussed
in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2T h e o r y
In this section we present two related models of employee based labour market discrimina-
tion. The ﬁrst model is a simple partial-equilibrium compensating diﬀerentials model in
which we do not explicitly allow for ﬁrm behaviour. This model clearly generates our two
main predictions, which we later empirically test using matched employer-employee data.
In order to investigate whether these predictions also apply to a situation with endogenous
ﬁrm behaviour, we then develop an extended version of Becker’s (1957, 1991) taste for
discrimination model in which workers hold preferences about the racial composition of
[5]their co-workers. Importantly, in this extension we allow for both heterogeneous workers
and ﬁrms.
2.1 A partial-equilibrium compensating diﬀerential model
We begin by writing the indirect utility function of an ethnic minority worker i at job (or
workplace) k as being a function of job satisfaction, individual characteristics, and wages:
uik = U(JSik,w ik,x i)( 2 . 1 )
JSik = JS(wik,eth k,x i,z k)
where JSik is the job satisfaction of individual i at job k; wik is the total amount of wages
of individual i at job k; ethk is the density of ethnic minority workers at job k; xi is a set
of individual characteristics, and zk is a set of characteristics of job k. We assume that
both U(.)a n dJS(.)a r ed i ﬀerentiable, increasing in wik, and continuous. By deﬁnition,
a taste for discrimination on the part of white workers implies
∂JSik
∂ethk < 0. Given that we
observe the job satisfaction of workers in the data set that we will use, we can check
this prediction if we also comprehensively control for other variables. Therefore, our ﬁrst
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1:G i v e n w a g e s ,ﬁrm, and individual characteristics, job sat-
isfaction is lower for white workers when there is a higher density of ethnic
minority co-workers at the workplace.
In a free-mobility equilibrium where there is a distribution of ethk for white workers
with the same individual characteristics, it has to be the case that these individuals are
indiﬀerent between working at their job and working at another job. This in turn means
that at the margin:
duik
dethk

































> 0( 2 . 3 )
which shows that white workers have to be compensated for working with ethnic minority
co-workers. This feature of an equilibrium leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: If employees have a taste for discrimination then, given ﬁrm
and individual characteristics, wages should be higher for white workers when
there are higher proportions of ethnic minority co-workers at the workplace.
Importantly, this result crucially assumes that there are no market imperfections that
would prevent white workers ﬂowing from one ﬁrm to another. Given such free mobility
however, it is clear that ﬁrms with many ethnic minority co-workers have to pay higher
wages to whites in order to attract white workers.
Now, we can complicate this simple model by hypothesising that there are intervening
mechanisms via which a taste for discrimination may work. To be precise, we can postulate
that:
JSik = JS(wik,x i,z k,g ik)( 2 . 4 )
gik = g(ethk)
where g(.) can be a stochastic function.
In words, this would imply that ethk works via another measurable variable gik. We
should then ﬁnd that gik is a factor explaining job satisfaction and compensating wage
diﬀerentials. What identiﬁes g as the ‘intervening’ factor, apart from theoretical consid-
erations, would be that the eﬀect of ethk on JSik, conditional on gik, becomes zero, and
that the eﬀect of ethk on wik conditional on gik becomes zero. In our empirical analysis
we will examine the two most prominent candidates for this intervening mechanism. The
ﬁrst is the level of racial tension at the workplace, as reported by the workplace manager.
[7]This is a direct indicator of an uneasiness between white and ethnic minority workers.
The second is the degree to which individuals feel insecure in their job, which has often
been argued by sociologists to be a major explanation for discrimination (e.g. Cassirer,
1996).
2.2 A general equilibrium model of employee tastes for racial discrimination
We now explore the nature of the competitive environment in which the above predictions
will also hold. To this aim, we extend Becker’s (1957, 1971) model of discrimination,
to include both individual and ﬁrm heterogeneity. This allows for ﬁrms with diﬀerent
ethnic minority densities and for individuals with diﬀerent skill levels. Importantly, these
assumptions are supported by recent empirical evidence. Carrington and Troske (1998)
and Hellerstein and Neumark (2004) found that black and white workers in the same ﬁrm
often have very diﬀerent skills. They also found that the inter-ﬁrm distribution of black
and white workers was close to that implied by random assignment.
We ﬁrst simplify the indirect utility function for white workers:
uik = JSik + γ1 lnwik + f1(xi)( 2 . 5 )
JSik = γ2 lnwik + δ1ethk + f2(xi)
where f1(.)a n df2(.) are arbitrary functions of individual characteristics. We can estimate
the second equation directly with our data. Some aspects of the ﬁrst equation we can
estimate indirectly, i.e. via observed wages.
As a normalisation we set γ1+γ2 =1 . This means the indirect decision-utility function
reads:
uik =l nwik + δ1ethk +[ f1(xi)+f2(xi)] (2.6)
where a taste for discrimination would imply that δ1 < 0. Now, we can introduce individual
heterogeneity by proposing that each white individual i has an eﬃciency number qwh
i of
‘white skills’. The total measure of white individuals is 1, and the cumulative distribution
of white eﬃciency numbers is denoted as Qwh(q). We assume that this distribution has
[8]ﬁnite mean and that Qwh(0) = 0. This last assumption essentially means that we assume
every worker has a positive marginal product. Hence we can interpret the unemployed as
having qwh =0 .
For ethnic minority workers, we take the same indirect utility framework and label
them by j:
ujk =l nwjk + δ2ethk +[ f3(xj)+f4(xj)] (2.7)
Each ethnic minority worker j has an eﬃciency number qem
j of ‘ethnic minority skills’. The
total measure of ethnic minority individuals is η and the cumulative distribution of ethnic
minority eﬃciency numbers is denoted by Qem(q). Again, we assume that this distribution
has ﬁnite mean and that Qem(0) = 0.
There is also a continuum of active ﬁrms in the economy. Following Becker, we take
a Cobb-Douglas production structure to explain why workers of diﬀerent ethnicities work







Here, WH k denotes the number of eﬃciency units of white skill that is employed in
workplace k. Also, EMk denotes the number of eﬃciency units of ethnic minority skill
employed in workplace k, and αk ∈ [0,1] is a production parameter speciﬁct ow o r k p l a c e
k. The cumulative distribution of αk is denoted by A(αk) and we assume it is increasing
and diﬀerentiable everywhere on αk ∈ h0,1i. There can be positive mass-points at αk =0
and αk =1 . This parameter allows for ﬁrms with only white workers (i.e. when αk equals
0), or only ethnic minority workers (when αk equals 1), or a mix (when 0<α k < 1). By
deﬁnition, ethk = EMk/(EMk + WHk).
For each individual ﬁrm k, the price of output is a decreasing function p(yk). We
assume that this function is continuous and diﬀerentiable for yk > 0, that
∂2p(yk)yk
∂2yk < 0
(i.e. decreasing marginal beneﬁt), that limyk↓0 p(yk) → +∞, and that limyk→∞ p(yk) → 0.
These standard assumptions guarantee that ﬁrm size will always be non-zero and ﬁnite.







j . Here, wwh
0 denotes the wage
for white workers in completely white workplaces. Its value, together with wem
0 , will be
solved by ﬁrm behaviour. The term e−δ1ethk > 1 equals the compensating diﬀerential that
white workers have to be given to work in workplace k. Under these wage schedules, all
workers are indiﬀerent about where they will work and a distribution of ethnic minority
densities can be observed. We will be able to directly estimate these wage equations in
the empirical part.
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm k reads:
πk = pk(yk)yk − EMke
−δ2ethkw
em




Since the cost function is homogeneous of degree one and the production function is
constant-returns to scale, the cost-minimising ratio
EMk
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0 )i sd i ﬀerentiable in wwh
0 and wem
0
















0 ) >e t h ∗
















)=0 i ﬀ αk =0







) < 1i ﬀ 0 <α k < 1

















k )αyk. Because the minimum of the cost function,
1We can illustrate this with a simple example. Take αk =0 .8,δ 1 = −0.1a n dδ2 =4 . There is then










≈ 16.7. More generally, we can specify a region δ1 < ∆∗(α)f o r
which WHke−δ1ethkwwh
0 , the second part of the cost function, is no longer convex and discontinuities











∂2EM } =0 }. This function is itself
decreasing, though it’s second derivative can be positive. For 0 >δ 1 > ∆∗(α)a n dδ2 < 0, the cost






0 ) is therefore diﬀerentiable everywhere.
[10]given yk,i sd i ﬀerentiable in wwh
0 and wem




What needs to be checked now is whether equilibrium actually exists and is unique.













































































Market equilibrium now requires that a set {wwh
0 ,w em









qdQwh(q). The right-hand side of these constraints
is simply a ﬁxed number. For existence, we can appeal to the ﬁxed-point theorem.2
Uniqueness, however, is not guaranteed3 because of the non-monotonicity of the demand
functions of the individual ﬁrms. Under the speciﬁc assumptions of this model therefore,
equilibria exist and will each yield a distribution of observed ethk where the wage proﬁles
will exhibit compensating diﬀerentials for a taste for discrimination. The crucial assump-
tion is that of no (long run) mobility restrictions of workers between ﬁrms and that there
is some skill complementarity between white and ethnic minority workers in some ﬁrms.
This assumption is supported by recent US empirical evidence (Carrington and Troske,
2The conditions for the ﬁxed point theorem apply: DEM(wwh
0 ,w em
0 )a n dDWH(wwh
0 ,w em
0 )a r ec o n t i n -
uous because the contribution of each ﬁrm is discontinuous only in a ﬁnite number of points with mass










0 ) = 0 and limwwh
0 →∞ DWH(wwh
0 ,wem





0 } that satisﬁes both constraints.
3The problem in proving uniqueness is that the non-convexity of the cost function allows for the
possibility at the individual ﬁrm that ∂EM
∂wwh > − ∂EM
∂wem > 0a n d∂WH
∂wem > −∂WH
∂wwh > 0f o rs o m er a n g e( f o r








∂wwh > 0. This in turn implies the possibility of multiple equilibria. In
each of these equilibria the relative wage schedules must still be the same though.
[11]1998; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004), who found that.black and white workers in the
same ﬁrm often deploy very diﬀerent skills.
Moreover, skill complementarity, which in our model reﬂects the ﬁrms where αk is
neither 1 nor 0, is not just about white and ethnic minority workers performing diﬀerent
production tasks in the whole economy. Clearly, it would be wrong to agrue that some
skills are ‘only’ performed by certain ethnic minoirty groups and not others. On the
level of the whole economy, it is more the case that some groups are over-represented
in some tasks. Even without aggregate skill diﬀerences, skill complementarities can still
exist if there are local monopolies combined with high costs of moving elsewhere. In such
circumstances, individuals are ‘captured’ in the sense that they have few options but to
work for a particular organisation or industry. If there are then any local diﬀerences in
the skill composition of the white and non-white labour force, that too can be seen as
a situation of skill complementarities, even if for the whole country there are no such
diﬀerences in skill composition between groups. Skill complementarities can also arise
‘as if’ in the situation where not skills but tastes over professions or jobs diﬀer. Groups
can for instance diﬀer in their reluctance to perform menial jobs, even though they are
‘objectively’ equally skilled at doing them. The group less reluctant to perform such a
task then in eﬀect can be seen as having a comparative advantage in that skill. Note
that there are many ways in which beneﬁt systems and social practices can lead to such
a situation. If, for instance, one group faces higher costs of working (e.g. higher loss
of beneﬁts, higher costs of childcare, higher opportunity costs) than that group will be
absent from the lowest paid skill-markets. This is not because they lack those skills, but
rather that they choose not to supply them. The group with lower costs of working will
then supply those skills. These situations are (within our data) observationally equivalent
to a situation where the skill composition between groups diﬀers.
3 Data and Variable Deﬁnitions
The data we use is drawn from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98)
which was collected between October 1997 and July 1998. The survey covered all work-
places with 10 or more employees, located in Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) and
[12]engaged in activities within Sections D (Manufacturing) to O (Other Community, Social
and Personal Services) of the 1992 Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation.4 The survey cov-
ered both private and public sector workplaces. The sample of workplaces was selected
through a process of stratiﬁed random sampling, with over-representation of larger work-
places and some industries using the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR). The
main objective of WERS98 was to provide a substantial bank of data on the nature of
workplace employment relations in Britain at the end of the 1990s (see Forth and Kirby,
2000, for additional details). This was the ﬁrst survey of its kind in Britain.
The Survey took place at the workplace level and had three distinct components:
(i) Main management interview: Consisting of a face-to-face interview with the
senior person at the workplace with day-to-day responsibility for industrial relations,
employee relations or personnel matters - 2191 managers were interviewed, with a
response rate of 80.4%;
(ii) Survey of employees: Consisting of a self-completion questionnaire distributed
to a random selection of up to 25 employees in each workplace - the questionnaire
was distributed at 1880 workplaces (manager permitting), with a response rate of
around 64%;
(iii) Worker representative interview (where present): Consisting of a face-to-face
interview with the most senior representative of the trade union with the largest
number of members at the workplace, or with the most senior employee represen-
tative who sits on a workplace-level consultative committee - this occurred in 947
workplaces (manager permitting, and where relevant), with a response rate of 82%.
Each of the three survey components can be linked by means of a unique workplace
identiﬁer. In this paper we use data from both the manager interview and the survey
of employees. Our sample comprises 1764 workplaces and just over 24,000 employees,
4Workplaces whose main activity lied within the following Sections of the 1992 Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation are not covered by WERS98: Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry (A), Fishing (B), Mining
and Quarrying (C), Private households with employed persons (P) and Extra-territorial organizations
and bodies (Q).
[13]and given the focus of the paper is restricted to white employees only.5 As m a l ln u m b e r
of observations (about 5%) were deleted due to either missing responses from managers
about key workplace characteristics or missing responses from employees about their job
satisfaction or wages. A simple probit analysis suggests that these missing observations
were reasonably random in observable characteristics. In this paper we use employees as
our unit of analysis, but match to them important workplace characteristics.
The key variable of interest in this paper is the proportion of the workplace who are of
ethnic minority origin, which we take as our measure for ethk. This information is collected
from the main manager interview.6 In percentage terms, the responses range from 0% to
88%, with the average workplace consisting of 4.7% (with a standard deviation of 9.1%)
of workers from ethnic minority groups. This reﬂects the 5.5% of the total population in
Britain who are from the ethnic minorities. Around 41.7% of workplaces have no ethnic
minority workers, a further 37.7% have between 1-5% of their workforce from the ethnic
minorities, 9.1% have between 6-10%, 6.8% have between 11-30% and 4.7% have more
than 30% of their workforce from the ethnic minorities.
The two dependent variables of interest are job satisfaction and wages, both of which
are self-reported by employees in the employee questionnaire. The job satisfaction ques-
tions contained in the WERS98 are:
How satisﬁed are you with the following aspects of your job?
1. The amount of inﬂuence you have over your job.
2. The amount of pay you receive.
3. The sense of achievement you get from your work. 5Although separate analyses investigating the eﬀect of ethnic minority density at the workplace on the
job satisfaction and wages of ethnic minority workers would be very interesting, the small sample of ethnic
minority workers contained in the WERS (given that there was no over-sampling of ethnic minorities)
prevents such a study.
6One clear limitation of the data, however, is that we only know the proportion of all ethnic minority
workers and not the detailed breakdown by particular ethnic groups. The main ethnic minority groups
in Britain are South Asian (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi), Black Caribbean, Black African and
Chinese. Therefore our estimates of the eﬀect of ethnic minority density at the workplace on the job
satisfaction and wages of white workers will be a weighted average since some white workers might prefer
working with certain ethnic minority groups more than others.
[14]4. The respect you get from supervisors/managers.
The responses to each of these questions wasr e p o r t e do na5 - p o i n t scale ranging from
Very Satisﬁed (1), Satisﬁed (2), Neither Satisﬁed or Dissatisﬁed (3), Dissatisﬁed (4) and
Very Dissatisﬁed (5). Unfortunately, employees were not asked directly to evaluate their
overall job satisfaction. Consequently, the job satisfaction measure we use is constructed
by creating four binary variables taking the value of unity if the worker reports to be either
Very Satisﬁed or Satisﬁed with a particular aspect of his or her job and zero otherwise. We
then sum over the four binary variables to get an overall job satisfaction score that ranges
between 0 (not satisﬁed with any aspects of the job) to 4 (Very Satisﬁed or Satisﬁed with
all four job aspects).
Ideally we would have liked to have a more direct measure of job satisfaction. However,
we would argue that a constructed index such as the one above is highly correlated with
overall job satisfaction. To provide some evidence for this argument for British workers we
can use data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) which collects information
on a wider range of job satisfaction aspects including a direct question on overall job
satisfaction.7Whilst the four questions outlined above are not exactly the same as in the
BHPS, we use the following four close counterparts: we have substituted (1) above with
”satisfaction with being able to use your own initiative”, (2) with ”satisfaction with pay”,
(3) with ”satisfaction with work itself” and (4) with ”satisfaction with relations with
boss”. Summing these responses as done above, we ﬁnd a very high correlation of 0.756
with overall reported job satisfaction.
Table 1 highlights the distribution of the constructed aggregate job satisfaction variable
by gender. It is clear that the majority of workers in Britain report to be satisﬁed with
the amount of inﬂuence they have over their job (57.9% of men, 60.2% of women), the
sense of achievement they get from their work (60.7%, 66.9%) and the respect they get
from supervisors/managers (54.2%, 62.45). In contrast, only 33.1% of males and 38.8%
of females report satisfaction with the amount they get paid. Interestingly, each of these
7However, data from the BHPS can not form the basis for our analysis as no information on eth-
nic density at the workplace is collected nor does it contain any detailed information about workplace
characteristics and working environment.
[15]ﬁgures is signiﬁcantly higher for females than males, which concurs with a number of
previous studies that have found that women generally report to be happier at work
than males (Clark, 1997). This gender diﬀerential is also clearly reﬂected in the average
satisfaction score of 2.06 for males and 2.28 for females.
The wage information collected from respondents of the employee questionnaire relates
to the following question:
”How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other deductions
are taken out? If your pay changes before tax from week to week because of
overtime, or because you work diﬀerent hours each week, think about what
y o ue a r no na v e r a g e ” .
One limitation with this question, however, is that respondents were not free to report
their wage exactly, but rather asked to report it within 12 bands. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of wages by gender. As expected, the male wage distribution lies substantially
to the right of the female distribution, which partly reﬂects the greater percentage of
females than males who are employed on a part-time basis. In the empirical wage models
we speciﬁcally control for the number of working hours.
To get a ﬁrst feel for the relationship between ethnic minority density at the workplace
and job satisfaction and wages, Tables 2 and 3, respectively, provide some simple cross-
tabulations of these variables. To aid this we have split the proportion of ethnic minorities
at the workplace into three categories:- no ethnic minorities at the workplace; a proportion
of 0.01 - 0.24 of workers from ethnic minoriti e s ;a n dag r e a t e rt h a n0 . 2 4p r o p o r t i o no f
ethnic minority workers. We similarly divide wages into four broad bands:- Very Low,
Low, Medium and High. For both males and females there is some suggestion that average
job satisfaction for white workers is lower in workplaces that have a high ethnic minority
density. However, the ’raw’ relationship between ethnic minority density and wages is less
clear. There is some evidence suggesting that the percentage of whites earning high wages
(i.e. > $360 per week) is greater in workplaces which have a high density of ethnic minority
workers. Similarly, very high ethnic minority density workplaces have signiﬁcantly fewer
workers earning less than $141 per week than workplaces with no ethnic minority workers.
[16]Overall, these relationships tentatively appear to be consistent with white workers having




Following the seminal work of Hamermesh (1977), Freeman (1978) and Borjas (1979), a
growing number of economics studies have empirically investigated the determinants of
job satisfaction, with a particular focus on the role of wages (both absolute and relative),
working hours, ﬁrm size and trade union density (e.g. Idson, 1990; Gordon and Denisi,
1995; Clark, 1996; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Laband and Lentz, 1998; Hamermesh, 2001;
Shields and Ward, 2001; Heywood et al., 2002; Booth et al., 2002; van Praag et al., 2003).
These studies have covered the workforce as a whole (e.g. Clark, 1996) and individual
professional groups such as academics (e.g. Ward and Sloane, 2000), nurses (e.g. Shields
and Ward, 2001) and lawyers (e.g. Laband and Lentz, 1998). However, we are unaware
of any study that has attempted to use matched employer-employee data to establish the
eﬀect on job satisfaction of working alongside co-workers from diﬀerent racial or ethnic
groups.
With reference to the empirical speciﬁcations used in these studies, and given the ordi-
nal nature of the job satisfaction variable combined with the matched employer-employee
nature of the data, we ﬁt the following random eﬀects ordered probit job satisfaction
equation to the data.8 Here JS∗
ik denotes the latent job satisfaction of white individual i
in workplace k and JSik the categorical observed value:
JS
∗
ik = xikβ1 + δ
∗
1ethk +l n ( wik)+vk +  i
8Note that we are not able to implement a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator since we do not observe time variation
in ethnic density at the workplace. However, we do believe that the extra individual and workplace-speciﬁc
control variables we include in the models comprehensively capture heterogeneity in worker skills, job
quality and the general working environment (Hirsch and McPherson, 2004).
[17]JSik = n ⇔ λn−1 <JS
∗
ik ≤ λn
where xik is a set of variables including ethnic minority density, ln(wik) is log wages, λn are
cut-oﬀ points increasing in n, vk is a normally distributed random eﬀect of the workplace,
and  i is an individual normally distributed random error. The categorical answers run
f r o mn = 0t on = 4 .A sn o r m a l i s a t i o n s ,w ep u tλ−1 =0 ,λ 4 = ∞, and Va r( i)=1 . Note
that this normalisation is not trivial in the sense that an observationally equivalent model
can be run with Va r( i)=σ2 in which all the estimated coeﬃcient would be a factor σ
higher. Hence, δ∗
1 only identiﬁes δ1
σ , which means a positive value for the estimated δ∗
1
only implies a positive δ1. The equation is estimated using Gaussian quadrature.
Considering the structural interpretation of this equation, we should bare in mind that
our extended theoretical model only allows for one endogenous workplace characteristic,
namely ethnic minority density. This means that in order to interpret β as the structural
estimates of the full model, we would have to interpret the coeﬃcients of any other work-
place speciﬁc variable as picking up some (otherwise unobserved) individual characteristic
such as worker quality. This consideration does not hold for the partial equilibrium model
where we can directly interpret the ﬁndings on δ∗
1 as giving direct evidence on discrimi-
natory tastes.





ik = xikβ2 + δ1ethk +  
w
k +  
w
i
wik = n ⇔ κn−1 <w
∗
ik ≤ κn
where δ1 refers to the full model and  w
i and  w
k are assumed to be independently normally
distributed. Given the banded characteristics of the wage information, this model is
estimated with standard interval-regression techniques, whereby the only peculiarity is
that the error term has two components instead of one. Again, this equation can be
directly interpreted in the partial equilibrium framework. In order to interpret it as an
estimation of the fully structural model, we would have to interpret the eﬀect of each xik
as due to the eﬀect of ﬁxed individual characteristics, such as worker quality.
[18]4.2 Explanatory variables
For both the job satisfaction and wage empirical models we perform a four-step sensitivity
analysis by successively increasing the number of variables in xik. Firstly, we ﬁt the models
including only direct personal characteristics and basic job characteristics as covariates
(termed the Basic speciﬁcation). These are: age, marital status, dependant children,
health, highest qualiﬁcation, broad occupation group, log weekly wages (calculated at the
mid-points of the bands), log working hours, whether the employee works from home,
temporary job, trade union membership and job tenure. Additionally, we control for
the unemployment / vacancy rate (in the travel-to-work area) and regional house prices
(which we have mapped into the data from external government sources). Secondly, we
then test the robustness of our main results by adding a number of individual work-
related characteristics to control for as much individual heterogeneity as possible (termed
Extended 1). These variables, interpreted as proxies for worker quality, are whether or not
the employee agrees that his or her job requires one to work very hard or does not have
enough time to get his or her job done, how many days of oﬀ-the-job employer-funded
training the worker has received in the last 12 months and whether the worker reports that
he or she is often asked for advice about workplace practices by supervisors/managers. All
of the variables identiﬁed so far are taken from information recorded during the employee
interview.
Thirdly, we extend these models using the unique matched employee-employer feature
of WERS98, by adding a wide range of workplace level information to comprehensively
capture various job circumstances and to control for workplace quality (referred to as
Extended 2). The variables, taken from the manager interview, include the percentage
of employees working part-time or who are female; whether an equal opportunities policy
is in force; trade union density; the number of employees and whether the workplace is
part of a multi-plant ﬁrm; broad industrial classiﬁcation and whether the owner-manager
is present. In addition, we control for a number of recent workplace history aspects
(all relating to the previous 12 months). These are whether there has been diﬃculties
ﬁlling vacancies; the percentages of vacancies ﬁlled internally; of full-time employees who
[19]received oﬀ-the-job employer-funded training; of workdays lost due to absence and of
workers who had a work-related injury. Furthermore, we include two variables to capture
aspects of the pay distribution, namely, the percentages of employees earning less than
$9,000 per year and more than $29,000 per year. We believe that in sum these variables
are likely to capture the majority of the heterogeneity in workplace quality and working
environment.
Given our interest in providing further insights into the mechanism by which discrim-
ination tastes exist, our ﬁnal speciﬁcation (Extended 3), additionally includes variables
that can be interpreted as ‘intervening variables’. These are whether or not a white
worker feels that his or her job is secure (taken from the employee questionnaire) and
whether there has been reported racial tension or complaints about working conditions at
the workplace in the 12 months (taken from the manager interview). The ﬁrst of these
v a r i a b l e sa l l o w su st oe x p l o r et h ep e r c e i v e dw i s d o mt h a ti ti sm a i n l yt h ee ﬀect of ethnic
minority workers on feelings of job-insecurity amongst white workers that generates a
taste for discrimination. More generally, these additional estimates will be informative
about the mechanisms by which race relations operate at the British workplace.
Importantly, in each of the four empirical speciﬁcations we also control for regional
house prices and unemployment / vacancy rates, in the travel-to-work area, in order to
allow for diﬀerences in the cost of living and outside employment opportunities across
Britain. Moreover, initial pooling tests suggest that it would be inappropriate to combine
both males and females into single models, thus we perform separate job satisfaction and
wage analyses by gender.
5 Empirical Results
The results from the four speciﬁcations of the job satisfaction workplace random eﬀects
ordered probit model for white males and females are shown, respectively, in Tables A1
and A2. Given the diﬃculty in interpreting the quantitative eﬀect of an explanatory
variable on job satisfaction from these non-linear models we also provide (for brevity,
only for the Extended 3 speciﬁcation) the associated Marginal Eﬀect (ME), calculated at
the means of the other explanatory variables and setting the random eﬀects term to be
[20]equal to zero. The corresponding results from the rando eﬀects interval wage regressions
are presented in Tables A3 and A4.
5.1 The eﬀect of ethnic minority density on job satisfaction and wages
In order to aid the discussion of the importanceo fe t h n i cm i n o r i t yd e n s i t ya tt h ew o r k p l a c e ,
we also report the parameter estimates for ethnic minority density for all speciﬁcations of
the job satisfaction and wage models and present them in Table 4.
In our most important result, we ﬁnd robust evidence that the eﬀect of ethnic minority
density on job satisfaction is negative for all speciﬁcations of the job satisfaction model for
both males and females.9 However, there is a clear diﬀerence in the magnitude of this eﬀect
by gender. Looking ﬁrst at the results for males, we see that in the Basic speciﬁcation,
with only individual characteristics as controls, the eﬀect is -0.629. The wage eﬀect is
largest here, with a white male having to be compensated by around 19% higher wages to
work in a workplace where all of his co-workers are from ethnic minorities, compared to a
workplace with no ethnic minority co-workers. When we add ‘job-involvement’ variables
(Extended 1), the negative eﬀect of ethnic minority density on job satisfaction increases
slightly, whereas there is a small decrease in the positive eﬀect of ethnic minority density
on wages (to 16%). A comparison of the log likelihood values also indicates that the ﬁt
of the models increases substantially. This supports the notion that ‘job-involvement’
variables capture a great deal of individual variation that is important in explaining both
wages and job satisfaction. Since they can be correlated with, but are not reasonably
caused by, ethnic minority density at the workplace, it is clearly important to control
for them. When we further add a host of workplace characteristics (Extended 2), the
importance of ethnic minority density drops both for job satisfaction (to -0.532) and
wages (to 12%). Given that these comprehensive workplace characteristics pick up a
great deal of individual and workplace quality information (as evidenced by the change
9Just for information, a simple bivariate model of job satisfaction, where job satisfaction is regressed
only on ethnic density, ﬁnds a coeﬃcient of -0.307 (t-stat = 1.88) for females and -0.415 (t-stat = 2.16)
for males. Bivariate wage models ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of 0.475 (t-stat = 3.29) and 1.016 (t-stat = 5.58),
respectively.
[21]in log-likelihoods), we view this speciﬁcation as yielding the most reliable estimate of the
total eﬀe c to fe t h n i cm i n o r i t yd e n s i t yo nw h i t em a l ew o r k e r s .
Turning to our ﬁnal speciﬁcation (Extended 3), where we include variables that can
be viewed as ‘intervening’, we surprisingly ﬁnd no change in the eﬀect of ethnic minority
density on either job satisfaction or wages (and little improvement in log-likelihoods).
Although job-insecurity indeed is an important variable for job satisfaction, it is appar-
ently not capturing any of the eﬀect of ethnic minority density. This is an interesting
ﬁnding which to some extent supports a number of recent studies which have found no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of immigration on the actual employment prospects, or the perceptions
of job security, amongst the majority population (see Borjas, 1999, for a general review;
and Dustmann and Preston, 2002, for British evidence).
When we turn to females, qualitatively the same story applies. Again job-involvement
variables capture a great deal of individual heterogeneity but do not alter the ethnic
minority density eﬀect. Workplace characteristics capture a lot of the eﬀect of ethnic
minority density though, both in wages and in job satisfaction. The absolute changes in
the eﬀects of ethnic minority density, when we include workplace characteristics, are the
same for males as for females. In this favoured speciﬁcation, the signs are the same as
for males, but the eﬀects are much smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant. Hence, insofar
as ethnic minority density is a negative job-amenity, it appears to be signiﬁcantly so for
white males but not for white females. Furthermore, when we add ‘intervening’ variables,
there is no substantial change in the eﬀect of ethnic minority density, implying that job
insecurity and racial tensions are not actually important intervening variables for the
eﬀect of ethnic minority density amongst white female employees.
In our favoured speciﬁcation (Extended 2 model), the eﬀect of ethnic minority density
on job satisfaction is -0.532 for males and -0.215 for females. On a 0 to 4 scale, this is
quite a large eﬀect, and indeed the ME’s for ethnic minority density are amongst the
largest of the entire set of variables. The wage eﬀects of ethnic minority density for this
speciﬁcation are 12% for males and 7% for females.10 If this wage eﬀect truly reﬂects
10Interestingly, these compensating wage diﬀerentials are very close to the hourly wage gaps, between
white and ethnic minority employees, found using WERS 98 by Pudney and Theodoropoulos (2003),
[22]the eﬀect of ethnic minority density as a job amenity, this would mean that an absolute
change of 0.1 in latent job satisfaction is roughly worth 2.5% in wages.
Apart from the robustness checks presented above, we have also ﬁtted several model
speciﬁcations that allowed for diﬀerential eﬀects for diﬀerent age and education groups.
Importantly, the estimated eﬀects of ethnic minority density were found to be similar
across age groups, education groups, and industries. However, signiﬁcance was aﬀected
by the reduction in sample size. We have also examined the robustness of these results to
two alternative derivations of overall job satisfaction, and found that our main results are
qualitatively unchanged. For example, instead of collapsing the 5-point responses to the
four job satisfaction questions into binary variables (i.e. 1= very satisﬁed or satisﬁed), and
then summing over the resulting four variables, we simply aggregrated the raw responses
leading to an overall job satisfaction variable ranging from 0 to 16.
5.2 The general determinants of job satisfaction
Overall, our results comply favourably with the ﬁndings of the recent job satisfaction
literature using British data (see, for example, Clark, 1996; Shields and Ward, 2001). We
too ﬁnd that job satisfaction in increasing with wages, and decreasing with hours of work,
for both men and women. For males, we ﬁnd a U-shaped relationship between age and
j o bs a t i s f a c t i o nb u t ,f o rf e m a l e s ,w eﬁnd that job satisfaction is clearly increasing with
age. However, the results concerning our wage distribution measures show little evidence
of a relative wage eﬀect. For both males and females, higher levels of education are
associated with reduced job satisfaction, whilst individuals in managerial and professional
occupations clearly have the highest job satisfaction levels. Interestingly, job satisfaction
is higher for workers who report that their job requires them to work very hard, for those
who have received employer-funded oﬀ-the-job training in the last year and for those who
are often asked advice from their supervisors/managers. Individuals who report that they
do not have enough time to get their job done have lower job satisfaction levels.
Turning to workplace characteristics, we ﬁnd that job satisfaction is higher at work-
namely 13% amongst males and 6% amongst females. The male ﬁnding also closely mirrors the 11% male
wage diﬀerential found for the UK in the 1990s by Blackaby et al. (1998, 2002).
[23]places that have a large proportion working part-time, but the gender composition of
the workplace is not a signiﬁcant predictor of job satisfaction. For males we ﬁnd that
employees in small workplaces report higher job satisfaction levels whereas females job
satisfaction levels are signiﬁcantly associated with the presence of an equal opportuni-
ties policy and trade union density. Industry is also an important determinant of job
satisfaction in Britain, even after controlling for many other workplace characteristics.
Interestingly, the percentage of workdays lost due to absence is not a signiﬁcant predictor
of job satisfaction at the workplace.
Turning to our intervening variables, which might explain the reasons for tastes for
discrimination arising, we ﬁnd that feelings of job insecurity signiﬁcantly reduce job sat-
isfaction for both males and females. However, we ﬁnd little evidence that working in
a workplace that has, according to the manager, experienced racial tension, discrimina-
tion or bad working conditions in the last 12 months, is associated with reported job
satisfaction levels. Finally, it is clearly the case that there exist unobserved workplace-
speciﬁc characteristics that impact on job satisfaction, even after extensively controlling
for workplace characteristics. This latter ﬁnding reinforces the usefulness of matched
employee-employer survey data when investigating the determinants of job satisfaction.
5.3 The determinant of wages
Finally, we will brieﬂy discuss the auxiliary results from the wage equations. As expected,
we ﬁnd a n-shaped age proﬁle, with wages being highest in the age range 40-49 for both
genders. Education is clearly important, as is marital status, having dependant children
and health. Occupation is a major predictor of wages, with wages being highest for
managers and professionals. There is the expected tenure proﬁle, and weekly wages are
increasing with hours worked. Working in a temporary job is associated with lower wages,
w h i l s tt h e r ea r ep o s i t i v ew a g ee ﬀects of working at home and being a member of a trade
union. Wages are higher in regions where house prices are high, capturing diﬀerences in
the cost of living across Britain. There is also some evidence for males that wages are
lower in travel-to-work areas that have higher unemployment / vacancy rates.
Those who undertook training in the last 12 months report higher wages, as do those
[24]workers who report that they are often asked by their supervisor/manager for advice
about workplace practices. For males only, wages are lower in workplaces that have a
high density of part-time workers and higher in workplaces that employ a high percent-
age of female workers. Trade union density is clearly associated with higher wages, but
wages are only higher in larger workplaces for males. Industry is an important predictor
of wages, with workers in ﬁnancial services earning the most. For females, wages are
higher in single workplace ﬁrms and lower in workplaces that have had problems ﬁlling
vacancies in the last 12 months. For males, there is some evidence indicating that wages
are higher in workplaces that suﬀer from a lot of work-related injuries, possibly capturing
a compensating diﬀerential eﬀect. Lastly, the workplace wage distribution variables have
the expected eﬀect, with an individual’s wages being higher in workplaces with a higher
percentage of workers earning more than $29,000 per year.
5.4 Limitations
Before we conclude it is important to note a number of robustness issues and limitations
of our analyses. In particular, for the following reasons we believe that the main results
should be viewed as lower bounds to the actual importance of workplace ethnic density
to white employees’ job satisfaction and wages:
1. Directly paying employees more for the same job is not the only way in which
workers can be compensated for job amenities. It is possible that one form of
compensation for job amenities is to assign someone to a higher occupation than
would otherwise be warranted on the basis of their human capital characteristics.
Similarly, negative amenities can be partially compensated by greater job security
and hence higher wages via longer tenure. We found that, for both occupation and
tenure, if they are omitted from the set of explanatory variables the eﬀects of ethnic
density increase. However, ﬁtting separate models that excluded occupations and
tenure only increased the wage eﬀects of ethnic density by a factor of about 1.2.
2. In an ideal analysis we would utilise a natural experiment or exogenous sorting of
workers into diﬀerent workplaces to identify the causal eﬀect of ethnic density on
[25]white employees job satisfaction and wages. One possible source of such exoge-
nous variation would result from government imposed positive aﬃrmative action
(or positive discrimination in favour of certain ethnic minority groups) in selected
occupations or industries. However, no such policy has been introduced in Britain.
Consequently, if there is heterogeneity in the extent to which white workers have
a taste or preference against working alongside ethnic minority co-workers, then in
our frictionless theoretical model there will be assortative matching i.e. white em-
ployees who have the least dislike of ethnic minority co-workers will be observed at
workplaces which have most ethnic minority co-workers (because their required com-
pensation is the lowest). This means that our estimated eﬀect of ethnic co-workers
might be lower than the latent eﬀect of ethnic co-workers on a random non-ethnic
individual. However, some support for the robustness of our results come from Car-
rington and Troske (1998), who document evidence that the inter-ﬁrm distribution
of black and white workers is close to that implied by random assignment in the US.
3. If the lower unobserved quality white workers are more likely to be found in work-
places with higher ethnic minority density, then this would bias our wage results
downward (Hwang et al., 1992).
4. If there is measurement error in the ethnic minority density at the workplace vari-
able, then this will bias our results towards zero. A potential cause of this is that
ethnic minority density is self-reported by the manager who may have imperfect
information, particularly in a very large ﬁrm. A related limitation of our analysis
is that we only have a measure for overall ethnic density at the workplace, so we
are not able to establish if white workers in Britain have a particularly strong taste
against working with certain ethnic minority groups but are indiﬀerent with respect
to other groups. This would be an interesting question for future research.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Becker (1957, 1971) proposed an important theory to explain the existence of racial dis-
crimination in the labour market, based on the idea that the dominant groups of workers
[26](i.e. whites) have a taste or preference against working alongside minority groups (i.e.
blacks). However, relative to the other major competing theories of discrimination, this
theory has had only limited empirical testing (see Altonji and Blank, 1999). An impor-
tant exception is Chiswick (1973), who found using state-level variation in the US, that
white workers of a given skill level, needed to receive compensation in the form of higher
weekly wages if they worked with non-whites. In this paper we contribute to this liter-
ature by using recently matched employer-employee data from Britain to investigate if
w h i t ew o r k e r sa r eo b s e r v e dt oh a v el o w e rj o bs a t i s f a c t i o nt h eh i g h e rt h ee t h n i cd e n s i t yi n
the workplace, and whether white workers need to be compensated by higher wages for
working alongside ethnic minority co-workers. To support the robustness of our empirical
results we have been able, given the high-quality of the data, to control comprehensively
for heterogeneity in individuals characteristics, job quality and general work environment.
To support our empirical analyses we have also contributed to the theoretical modelling
of employee-based discrimination by developing a structural model that incorporates both
individual and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
We have found clear evidence in support for these two predictions. Importantly, job
satisfaction is found to be signiﬁcantly lower for white workers in workplaces with a high
density of ethnic minorities, and white male workers require a wage premium of around
12% to compensate them for a move from a workplace with no ethnic minority co-workers
to one with only ethnic minority co-workers. We believe that the magnitude of this es-
timate is reasonable, and is consistent with a structural model of worker allocation in
the presence of a taste for discrimination amongst employees. For females, the eﬀects are
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant, with a necessary compensating diﬀerential of about
7%. This concurs with earlier ﬁndings for the US by Carrington and Troske (1998) that
only a small amount of compensation is needed for females. The ﬁnding of racial prejudice
in Britain, particularly for males, is supported by the recent ﬁndings of Dustmann and
Preston (2001), for the population generally, and by Shields and Wheatley Price (2002a,
2002b), who examine the reported incidence of racial harassment at the workplace. Strik-
ingly 38% of the population sample reported being at least a little prejudiced against
people of other races whilst over half of ethnic minority nurses claim to have been the vic-
[27]tim of racially-motivated abuse from co-workers. Given the current high-proﬁle debate in
Britain and elsewhere about the costs and beneﬁts of increased immigration, an additional
important ﬁnding is that the taste for discrimination does not appear to operate through
greater job insecurity for white workers. This is consistent with the international litera-
ture that ﬁnds that immigration has little impact on natives employment opportunities
or wages (see, Borjas, 1999).
Finally, we should note some limitations of our analysis. If anything, we have argued
that due to data limitations and the lack of exogenous sorting of white employees into
workplace with diﬀerent ethnic minority densities, our estimates of the required compen-
sation required by white workers employed alongside ethnic minority co-workers, are likely
to be lower bounds. Moreover, an alternative explanation consistent with our results is
that white workers and ethnic minority co-workers simply ﬁnd it hard to get along because
of language or other cultural barriers. To assign blame to a white worker who prefers to
work with people he or she might not get along with easily is not necessarily warranted.
Similarly, there may be a taste for discrimination amongst ethnic minority employees, al-
though we have been unable to investigate this possibility with our data. Future research
may shed more light on this topic and provide further conﬁrmation of the presence of
employee discrimination at the workplace.
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TABLE 1: The Distribution of Job Satisfaction by Gender 
Percentage  MALES FEMALES 
    
Job Satisfaction Aspect 
 
  




















  Note: Standard error of mean value shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2: Average Job Satisfaction by Workplace Ethnic Density 
Percentage  MALES FEMALES 
Ethnic Density    
















TABLE 3: Wage Distribution by Workplace Ethnic Density 
Percentage  MALES  FEMALES 
  L M1  M2 H  L M1  M2 H 
Ethnic Density          
















































Notes: Standard error of mean value shown in parentheses. L (low wages) means wages less than £141 per week; M1 (lower 
middle) means wages between £141 and £260 per week, M2 (higher middle) means wages between £261 and £360 per week and 
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TABLE 4: Summary of Main Results 
  BASIC  EXTENDED 1  EXTENDED 2  EXTENDED 3 
  β   t-stat ME  β   t-stat ME  β   t-stat ME  β   t-stat ME 
                  
MALES                  
Job Satisfaction Models                  
Ratio of ethnic minorities to whites  -0.629  -4.75  -0.16  -0.703 -4.20 -0.17 -0.532 -2.99 -0.13 -0.468 -2.34 -0.12 
Wage Models                  
Ratio of ethnic minorities to whites  0.188  2.25  -  0.158 2.10  -  0.117 1.85    0.123 1.91  - 
FEMALES                  
Job Satisfaction Models                  
Ratio of ethnic minorities to whites  -0.339 -2.22 -0.10 -0.389 -1.96 -0.11 -0.215 -1.06 -0.06 -0.137 -0.68 -0.04 
Wage Models                  
Ratio of ethnic minorities to whites  0.165  2.37 - 0.159  2.29 - 0.071  1.18 - 0.065  1.08 - 
Notes: The full sets of parameter estimates for each of the models are given in Table A1-A4 in the appendix. ME is the marginal 
effect (estimated from the ordered probit random effects models) calculated at the means of the explanatory variables and setting 

































   38
TABLE A1: The Determinants of Job Satisfaction for White Males: 
Ordered Probit (Workplace) Random Effects Estimates 
Explanatory Variables  BASIC  EXTENDED 1  EXTENDED 2  EXTENDED 3 
  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat ME 
Percentage of ethnic minorities / 100  -0.629 -4.75 -0.703 -4.20 -0.532 -2.99  -0.468  -2.34  -0.124 
Age 25-29  -0.222 -4.63 -0.140 -2.80 -0.137 -2.66  -0.112  -2.18  -0.024 
Age 30-39  -0.239 -5.18 -0.118 -2.40 -0.119 -2.36  -0.032  -0.62  -0.007 
Age 40-49  -0.184 -3.81 -0.032 -0.61 -0.036 -0.68 0.090 1.65 0.021 
Age 50-59  -0.039 -0.77 0.126  2.30  0.119 2.12  0.245  4.28  0.060 
Age > 60  0.369 5.31 0.587 7.96 0.566 7.55  0.614  7.94  0.176 
Married / Co-habiting  0.004 0.16 0.005 0.19 0.006 0.22  0.002  0.09  0.001 
Dependant children  -0.001 -0.03 0.007  0.20  0.004 0.10  0.015  0.42  0.003 
Long-term health condition  -0.192 -4.43 -0.188 -4.15 -0.185 -4.08  -0.174  -3.79  -0.036 
Degree or equivalent  -0.284 -7.01 -0.264 -6.19 -0.277 -6.27  -0.264  -5.98  -0.056 
'A' level or equivalent  -0.272 -6.67 -0.258 -6.09 -0.260 -6.02  -0.247  -5.71  -0.051 
'O' level or equivalent  -0.215 -6.12 -0.208 -5.76 -0.210 -5.70  -0.194  -5.22  -0.041 
CSE or equivalent  -0.068 -1.69 -0.069 -1.67 -0.075 -1.78  -0.069  -1.62  -0.015 
Manager  0.358 6.77 0.243 4.15 0.206 3.38  0.233  3.72  0.057 
Professional  0.060 1.16 0.052 0.92 0.013 0.22  0.026  0.42  0.006 
Technical  -0.169 -3.22 -0.163 -2.85 -0.168 -2.81  -0.148  -2.43  -0.031 
Clerical  -0.221 -3.98 -0.231 -3.86 -0.219 -3.49  -0.187  -2.96  -0.038 
Craft  -0.114 -2.47 -0.093 -1.82 -0.117 -2.14  -0.096  -1.74  -0.021 
Services  -0.017 -0.29 -0.105 -1.50 -0.128 -1.65  -0.091  -1.16  -0.020 
Operator  -0.374 -8.03 -0.341 -6.54 -0.332 -6.01  -0.349  -6.21  -0.069 
Other  -0.208 -4.15 -0.156 -2.83 -0.157 -2.70  -0.172  -2.91  -0.036 
Log weekly wages (pre-tax )  0.396 13.61 0.335 10.17 0.379 10.80  0.396  11.16  0.089 
Log hours  -0.404 -10.41 -0.385 -9.04  -0.372 -8.42  -0.382  -8.78  -0.086 
Works at home  0.234 7.22 0.198 5.25 0.205 5.37  0.207  5.39  0.050 
Temporary job  0.133 2.72 0.123 2.45 0.133 2.59  0.330  6.52  0.085 
Trade union member  -0.175 -8.24 -0.191 -7.27 -0.151 -4.72  -0.112  -3.47  -0.025 
< 1 year with current firm  0.258 6.90 0.218 5.39 0.215 5.24  0.234  5.74  0.057 
1 - 2 years with current firm  0.099 2.53 0.071 1.67 0.067 1.55  0.111  2.52  0.026 
3 - 5 years with current firm  0.081 2.68 0.070 2.16 0.064 1.92  0.079  2.39  0.018 
6 - 10 years with current firm  -0.012 -0.39 0.002  0.07  -0.002 -0.07 0.002 0.06 0.001 
Log regional house prices  0.000 -1.67 0.012 0.24  0.006 0.12  0.007  0.12  0.002 
Unemployment rate (travel-to-work-area)  0.003 0.53 0.006 0.76 0.007 0.88  0.015  1.82  0.003 
Agree - Job requires one to work very hard  -  -  0.159 6.07 0.160  6.02 0.147 5.48 0.032 
Agree - Not enough time to get job done  -  -  -0.332 -13.87 -0.333  -13.55 -0.295 -11.71 -0.065 
1-4 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.356 11.10 0.376  11.24 0.339 10.01 0.084 
5-10 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.200 7.48 0.208  7.42 0.194 6.92 0.045 
Often asked advice about workplace practices  -  -  0.611 20.12 0.607  19.84 0.556 17.83 0.147 
% of employees working part-time  -  -  - -  0.002  2.63  0.002  2.36  0.001 
% of employees who are female  -  -  - -  0.001  1.45  0.001  0.69  0.000 
Equal opportunities policy in force  -  -  - -  -0.008  -0.22  -0.003  -0.08  -0.001 
Trade union density at workplace  -  -  - -  0.000  -0.79  0.000  0.08  0.000 
Log firm size (no. of employees)  -  -  - -  -0.033  -2.19  -0.031  -2.00  -0.007   39
TABLE A1: (Continued) 
Construction -  -  - -  0.047  0.83  0.039  0.70  0.009 
Wholesale -  -  - -  -0.153  -3.23  -0.189  -3.85  -0.040 
Hotels and restaurants  -  -  - -  -0.108  -1.26  -0.101  -1.19  -0.022 
Transport -  -  - -  -0.123  -2.26  -0.140  -2.55  -0.030 
Financial -  -  - -  -0.216  -3.21  -0.130  -1.85  -0.027 
Other business  -  -  - -  -0.130  -2.39  -0.127  -2.30  -0.027 
Education -  -  - -  -0.115  -1.76  -0.238  -3.48  -0.048 
Health -  -  - -  -0.148  -2.14  -0.128  -1.83  -0.027 
Other -  -  - -  -0.107  -1.76  -0.126  -1.96  -0.027 
Single workplace firm  -  -  - -  0.109  2.64  0.108  2.46  0.025 
Owner manager firm  -  -  - -  -0.017  -0.34  -0.050  -0.93  -0.011 
Problem filling vacancies  -  -  - -  -0.033  -1.22  -0.045  -1.66  -0.010 
% of vacancies filled internally  -  -  - -  -0.002  -0.26  -0.007  -0.89  -0.002 
% of employees receiving off-the-job training  -  -  - -  0.006  0.82  0.007  1.09  0.002 
% of workdays lost due to absence  - - - -  -0.004  -0.93  -0.007  -1.68  -0.002 
% of workers having workplace injury  - - - -  -0.351  -1.33  -0.384  -1.36  -0.086 
Absence information missing  - - - -  -0.072  -1.81  -0.062  -1.53  -0.014 
Injury information missing  - - - -  -0.011  -0.35  0.003  0.09  0.001 
% of employees <£9,000 per year  -  -  -  -  0.000 0.54  0.000  0.21  0.000 
% of employees >£29,000 per year  -  -  -  -  0.000 1.09  0.000  1.26  0.000 
Racial tensions at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  0.052  0.43  0.012 
Discrimination at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.072  -1.17  -0.016 
Bad conditions concerns at workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  0.014  0.42  0.003 
Agree that your job is secure  -  -  -  -  - -  0.813  27.49  0.182 
Indifferent about job security  -  -  -  -  - -  0.356  11.16  0.087 
Standard deviation of random effect  0.071 3.06 0.213  12.18 0.194 10.16  0.198  10.39   
Log Likelihood  -16080    -14999    -14965    -14557    
Sample  10052    10052    10052    10052    
Notes: The omitted categories are age less than 25, single, no children, free of long-term health condition, no qualifications, sales, does not work 
at home, permanent job, not a trade union member, with current firm more than 10 years, does not agree that 'my job requires that I work very 
hard', does not agree that 'I never seem to have enough time to get my job done', has not undertaken any employer-funded off-the-job training in 
last 12 months, manager does not frequently ask my views about changes to work practices, no equal opportunities policy at the workplace, 
manufacturing sector, multi-workplace firm, no owner manager, no problems filling vacancies in last 12 months, no problems due to racial 
harassment at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to discrimination at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to bad 
working conditions at the workplace in last 12 months and disagree with the statement 'I feel my job is secure in this workplace'. The ME is the 
marginal effect from Extended 3 model calculated at the means of the explanatory variables and setting the random effects term to zero. '-' 
means that the variable is not included in model.   40
TABLE A2: The Determinants of Job Satisfaction for White Females: 
Ordered Probit (Workplace) Random Effects Estimates 
Explanatory Variables  BASIC  EXTENDED 1  EXTENDED 2  EXTENDED 3 
  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat ME 
Percentage of ethnic minorities / 100  -0.339 -2.22 -0.389 -1.96 -0.215 -1.06  -0.137  -0.68  0.044 
Age 25-29  0.036 0.83 0.088 1.86 0.084 1.77  0.115  2.42  0.033 
Age 30-39  0.016 0.41 0.083 1.96 0.073 1.67  0.147  3.36  0.042 
Age 40-49  0.078 1.85 0.150 3.32 0.124 2.68  0.221  4.74  0.065 
Age 50-59  0.192 4.13 0.273 5.45 0.246 4.80  0.336  6.47  0.102 
Age > 60  0.561 6.98 0.637 7.49 0.605 6.95  0.640  7.37  0.216 
Married / Co-habiting  0.117 4.66 0.124 4.65 0.119 4.38  0.121  4.44  0.033 
Dependant children  0.015 0.42 0.022 0.58 0.028 0.73  0.032  0.83  0.009 
Long-term health condition  -0.221 -4.31 -0.194 -3.59 -0.184 -3.38  -0.163  -2.97  -0.043 
Degree or equivalent  -0.502 -11.78 -0.502 -10.92 -0.522 -11.04  -0.496  -10.49  -0.124 
'A' level or equivalent  -0.308 -7.78 -0.323 -7.68 -0.328 -7.61  -0.291  -6.76  -0.075 
'O' level or equivalent  -0.194 -5.89 -0.205 -5.83 -0.204 -5.71  -0.179  -4.97  -0.049 
CSE or equivalent  -0.054 -1.31 -0.068 -1.56 -0.073 -1.65  -0.055  -1.23  -0.015 
Manager  0.430 7.88 0.367 6.08 0.361 5.66  0.385  6.03  0.121 
Professional  0.229 4.66 0.233 4.12 0.164 2.65  0.162  2.60  0.047 
Technical  0.051 1.11 0.018 0.34 0.015 0.25  0.028  0.45  0.008 
Clerical  -0.047 -1.38 -0.010 -0.25 -0.008 -0.16 0.006 0.12 0.002 
Craft  -0.005 -0.06 0.022  0.21  -0.003 -0.03 0.061 0.54 0.018 
Services  0.111 2.71 0.004 0.09 -0.042 -0.73 -0.006 -0.10  -0.002 
Operator  -0.332 -5.76 -0.331 -4.86 -0.349 -4.54  -0.331  -4.25  -0.081 
Other  0.093 2.14 0.096 1.84 0.083 1.44  0.099  1.69  0.029 
Log weekly wages (pre-tax )  0.255 9.20 0.229 7.36 0.258 7.86  0.276  8.26  0.077 
Log hours  -0.332 -10.02 -0.337 -9.01  -0.334 -8.69  -0.335  -8.68  -0.094 
Works at home  0.364 8.94 0.344 7.53 0.341 7.40  0.355  7.73  0.111 
Temporary job  0.044 1.08 0.036 0.80 0.028 0.60  0.267  5.71  0.081 
Trade union member  -0.154 -6.67 -0.179 -6.54 -0.188 -6.11  -0.157  -5.08  -0.043 
< 1 year with current firm  0.273 7.33 0.214 5.22 0.223 5.41  0.219  5.29  0.065 
1 - 2 years with current firm  0.115 2.99 0.057 1.38 0.062 1.47  0.060  1.44  0.017 
3 - 5 years with current firm  0.076 2.39 0.054 1.57 0.059 1.69  0.069  1.99  0.020 
6 - 10 years with current firm  0.009 0.27 -0.004  -0.11  -0.002 -0.04 0.006 0.18 0.002 
Log regional house prices  0.000 -3.26 -0.090  -1.71 -0.105 -1.93  -0.121  -2.19  -0.034 
Unemployment rate (travel-to-work-area)  -0.009 -1.52 -0.011 -1.31 -0.010 -1.25  -0.008  -0.99  -0.002 
Agree - Job requires one to work very hard  -  -  0.177 5.96 0.181  5.99 0.157 5.18 0.042 
Agree - Not enough time to get job done  -  -  -0.337 -13.90 -0.343  -14.00 -0.320 -12.88 -0.088 
1-4 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.297 8.45 0.309  8.64 0.284 7.92 0.086 
5-10 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.172 6.76 0.173  6.64 0.161 6.10 0.046 
Often asked advice about workplace practices  -  -  0.560 17.43 0.557  17.26 0.502 15.78 0.157 
% of employees working part-time  -  -  - -  0.003  3.38  0.002  3.15  0.001 
% of employees who are female  -  -  - -  0.000  -0.39  -0.001  -0.90  0.000 
Equal opportunities policy in force  -  -  - -  -0.090  -2.33  -0.059  -1.49  -0.017 
Trade union density at workplace  -  -  - -  0.001  1.41  0.001  2.28  0.000 
Log firm size (no. of employees)  -  -  - -  -0.010  -0.66  -0.011  -0.77  -0.003   41
TABLE A2: (Continued) 
Construction -  -  - -  -0.003  -0.04  -0.007  -0.07  -0.002 
Wholesale -  -  - -  -0.150  -2.45  -0.210  -3.41  -0.056 
Hotels and restaurants  -  -  - -  -0.071  -0.86  -0.098  -1.17  -0.026 
Transport -  -  - -  -0.180  -2.27  -0.209  -2.57  -0.054 
Financial -  -  - -  -0.238  -3.57  -0.170  -2.44  -0.045 
Other business  -  -  - -  0.014  0.23  -0.009  -0.14  -0.002 
Education -  -  - -  0.013  0.21  -0.054  -0.84  -0.015 
Health -  -  - -  -0.107  -1.67  -0.089  -1.37  -0.025 
Other -  -  - -  -0.117  -1.59  -0.116  -1.48  -0.031 
Single workplace firm  -  -  - -  -0.025  -0.64  -0.035  -0.89  -0.010 
Owner manager firm  -  -  - -  0.096  1.87  0.072  1.31  0.021 
Problem filling vacancies  -  -  - -  -0.068  -2.47  -0.071  -2.54  -0.020 
% of vacancies filled internally  -  -  - -  0.007  0.95  -0.003  -0.39  -0.001 
% of employees receiving off-the-job training  -  -  - -  -0.009  -1.24  -0.004  -0.54  -0.001 
% of workdays lost due to absence  - - - -  0.001  0.37  0.000  0.02  0.000 
% of workers having workplace injury  - - - -  -1.096  -3.19  -1.152  -3.51  -0.323 
Absence information missing  - - - -  -0.053  -1.32  -0.062  -1.56  -0.017 
Injury information missing  - - - -  -0.013  -0.39  -0.017  -0.52  -0.005 
% of employees <£9,000 per year  -  -  -  -  -0.001 -1.66  -0.001  -2.38  0.000 
% of employees >£29,000 per year  -  -  -  -  0.000 1.09  0.000  1.25  0.000 
Racial tensions at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.008  -0.07  -0.002 
Discrimination at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.031  -0.46  -0.009 
Bad conditions concerns at workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.027  -0.71  -0.008 
Agree that your job is secure  -  -  -  -  - -  0.753  23.76  0.199 
Indifferent about job security  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.001  -0.68  0.080 
Standard deviation of random effect  0.071 2.76 0.228  12.28 0.202 10.70  0.200 7.79   
Log Likelihood  -16117    -15174    -15128    -14790    
Sample  10085    10085    10085    10085    
Notes: The omitted categories are age less than 25, single, no children, free of long-term health condition, no qualifications, sales, does not work 
at home, permanent job, not a trade union member, with current firm more than 10 years, does not agree that 'my job requires that I work very 
hard', does not agree that 'I never seem to have enough time to get my job done', has not undertaken any employer-funded off-the-job training in 
last 12 months, manager does not frequently ask my views about changes to work practices, no equal opportunities policy at the workplace, 
manufacturing sector, multi-workplace firm, no owner manager, no problems filling vacancies in last 12 months, no problems due to racial 
harassment at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to discrimination at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to bad 
working conditions at the workplace in last 12 months and disagree with the statement 'I feel my job is secure in this workplace'. The ME is the 
marginal effect from Extended 3 model calculated at the means of the explanatory variables and setting the random effects term to zero. '-' 
means that the variable is not included in model.   42
TABLE A3: The Determinants of Log Weekly Wages for White Males: 
Random Effects Interval Regression Estimates 
Explanatory Variables  BASIC  EXTENDED 1  EXTENDED 2  EXTENDED 3 
  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat 
Percentage of ethnic minorities / 100  0.188 2.25 0.158 2.10 0.117 1.85  0.123  1.91 
Age 25-29  0.250 13.71 0.257 14.10 0.223 13.30 0.224  13.37 
Age 30-39  0.355 19.92 0.364 20.37 0.328 20.03 0.329  20.08 
Age 40-49  0.397 21.08 0.410 21.64 0.388 22.09 0.388  22.16 
Age 50-59  0.381 19.09 0.396 19.69 0.380 20.47 0.380  20.49 
Age > 60  0.212 8.27 0.237 9.30 0.247 10.41 0.247  10.46 
Married / Co-habiting  0.105 12.19 0.103 12.11 0.086 11.23 0.085  11.16 
Dependant children  0.041 4.10 0.040 4.10 0.042 4.77  0.043  4.79 
Long-term health condition  -0.034 -2.17 -0.032 -2.06 -0.030 -2.39  -0.030  -2.40 
Degree or equivalent  0.265 17.51 0.263 17.48 0.263 18.94 0.263  18.96 
'A' level or equivalent  0.142 10.07 0.138 9.79  0.133 10.36 0.133  10.36 
'O' level or equivalent  0.082 6.77 0.079 6.60 0.086 7.93  0.086  7.91 
CSE or equivalent  0.023 1.66 0.022 1.59 0.037 2.96  0.037  2.95 
Manager  0.487 18.78 0.467 18.45 0.421 19.30 0.420  19.27 
Professional  0.393 14.84 0.382 14.72 0.344 15.15 0.343  15.09 
Technical  0.285 11.07 0.278 10.99 0.183 8.35  0.182  8.30 
Clerical  0.094 3.53 0.092 3.54 -0.005 -0.22  -0.006  -0.25 
Craft  0.122 4.86 0.126 5.13 0.052 2.43  0.051  2.40 
Services  -0.158 -3.95 -0.172 -4.23 -0.107 -2.61  -0.106  -2.59 
Operator  -0.025 -0.96 -0.010 -0.40 -0.088 -4.06  -0.088  -4.08 
Other  -0.178 -6.89 -0.163 -6.47 -0.147 -6.45  -0.148  -6.45 
Log hours  0.697 23.64 0.694 23.40 0.606 20.81 0.606  20.82 
Works at home  0.148 11.08 0.136 10.35 0.093 7.87  0.093  7.84 
Temporary job  -0.152 -6.63 -0.148 -6.48 -0.122 -6.06  -0.122  -6.06 
Trade union member  0.094 8.88 0.086 8.20 0.048 4.87  0.048  4.88 
< 1 year with current firm  -0.160 -10.81 -0.166 -11.19 -0.125 -9.36  -0.125  -9.31 
1 - 2 years with current firm  -0.145 -9.72 -0.151  -10.05 -0.106 -7.96  -0.106  -7.89 
3 - 5 years with current firm  -0.093 -8.50 -0.094 -8.69 -0.055 -5.65  -0.054  -5.59 
6 - 10 years with current firm  -0.062 -6.02 -0.059 -5.83 -0.034 -3.62  -0.034  -3.59 
Log regional house prices  0.262 11.51 0.269 12.01 0.246 12.27 0.245  12.22 
Unemployment rate (travel-to-work-area)  -0.005 -1.31 -0.004 -1.10 -0.006 -1.97  -0.006  -1.91 
Agree - Job requires one to work very hard  -  -  0.004 0.41 0.011  1.35 0.010 1.30 
Agree - Not enough time to get job done  -  -  -0.023 -3.00 -0.013  -1.81 -0.012 -1.78 
1-4 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.090 8.01 0.052  5.04 0.052 5.07 
5-10 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.064 7.53 0.044  5.62 0.045 5.64 
Often asked advice about workplace practices  -  -  0.039 3.88 0.052  5.39 0.051 5.37 
% of employees working part-time  -  -  - -  -0.005  -12.38  -0.005  -12.33 
% of employees who are female  -  -  - -  0.001  2.40  0.001  2.35 
Equal opportunities policy in force  -  -  - -  0.011  0.74  0.011  0.74 
Trade union density at workplace  -  -  - -  0.001  2.49  0.001  2.42 
Log firm size (no. of employees)  -  -  - -  0.027  4.77  0.027  4.76   43
TABLE A3: (Continued) 
Construction -  -  - -  -0.005  -0.25  -0.004  -0.21 
Wholesale -  -  - -  -0.034  -1.88  -0.034  -1.85 
Hotels and restaurants  -  -  - -  -0.134  -4.37  -0.134  -4.40 
Transport -  -  - -  -0.054  -2.76  -0.052  -2.65 
Financial -  -  - -  0.061  2.33  0.064  2.39 
Other business  -  -  - -  -0.030  -1.34  -0.029  -1.28 
Education -  -  - -  -0.128  -5.46  -0.127  -5.39 
Health -  -  - -  -0.114  -4.22  -0.113  -4.17 
Other -  -  - -  -0.074  -3.13  -0.073  -3.07 
Single workplace firm  -  -  - -  -0.013  -0.84  -0.014  -0.87 
Owner manager firm  -  -  - -  -0.025  -1.26  -0.024  -1.19 
Problem filling vacancies  -  -  - -  0.011  1.05  0.011  1.03 
% of vacancies filled internally  -  -  - -  -0.006  -2.09  -0.006  -2.15 
% of employees receiving off-the-job training  -  -  - -  -0.002  -0.89  -0.003  -0.91 
% of workdays lost due to absence  - - - -  -0.002  -1.19  -0.002  -1.22 
% of workers having workplace injury  - - - -  0.168  1.75  0.159  1.70 
Absence information missing  - - - -  -0.026  -1.72  -0.027  -1.80 
Injury information missing  - - - -  0.046  3.97  0.046  3.93 
% of employees <£9,000 per year  -  -  -  -  -0.001 -3.11  -0.001  -3.34 
% of employees >£29,000 per year  -  -  -  -  0.001 6.48  0.001  6.74 
Racial tensions at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  0.019  0.39 
Discrimination at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.019  -0.96 
Bad conditions concerns at workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  0.012  0.90 
Agree that your job is secure  -  -  -  -  - -  0.002  0.22 
Indifferent about job security  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.002  -0.28 
Log Likelihood  -18429    -18353    -17566    -17563   
Sample  10052    10052    10052    10052   
Notes: The omitted categories are age less than 25, single, no children, free of long-term health condition, no qualifications, sales, does not work 
at home, permanent job, not a trade union member, with current firm more than 10 years, does not agree that 'my job requires that I work very 
hard', does not agree that 'I never seem to have enough time to get my job done', has not undertaken any employer-funded off-the-job training in 
last 12 months, manager does not frequently ask my views about changes to work practices, no equal opportunities policy at the workplace, 
manufacturing sector, multi-workplace firm, no owner manager, no problems filling vacancies in last 12 months, no problems due to racial 
harassment at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to discrimination at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to bad 
working conditions at the workplace in last 12 months and disagree with the statement 'I feel my job is secure in this workplace'. '-' means that 
the variable is not included in model. The standard errors have been adjusted for workplace clustering.   44
TABLE A4: The Determinants of Log Weekly Wages for White Females: 
Random Effects Interval Regression Estimates 
Explanatory Variables  BASIC  EXTENDED 1  EXTENDED 2  EXTENDED 3 
  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat  β   t-stat 
Percentage of ethnic minorities / 100  0.165 2.37 0.159 2.29 0.071 1.18  0.065  1.08 
Age 25-29  0.163 11.23 0.162 11.22 0.126 9.45  0.126  9.46 
Age 30-39  0.233 15.55 0.231 15.43 0.202 14.90 0.202  14.86 
Age 40-49  0.220 15.03 0.219 14.98 0.212 15.92 0.212  15.84 
Age 50-59  0.208 12.59 0.209 12.67 0.207 13.69 0.207  13.60 
Age > 60  0.127 4.46 0.130 4.62 0.140 5.36  0.140  5.39 
Married / Co-habiting  0.007 0.84 0.006 0.73 0.007 1.01  0.007  0.99 
Dependant children  0.060 5.11 0.059 5.01 0.054 4.93  0.054  4.95 
Long-term health condition  -0.062 -4.18 -0.061 -4.10 -0.056 -3.86  -0.057  -3.92 
Degree or equivalent  0.343 21.60 0.337 21.13 0.320 21.52 0.319  21.38 
'A' level or equivalent  0.193 14.44 0.188 14.08 0.173 14.26 0.172  14.20 
'O' level or equivalent  0.134 11.77 0.130 11.44 0.122 11.73 0.121  11.69 
CSE or equivalent  0.029 2.23 0.027 2.04 0.040 3.32  0.039  3.26 
Manager  0.562 26.03 0.550 25.75 0.453 21.78 0.453  21.73 
Professional  0.470 21.49 0.458 21.20 0.394 17.25 0.394  17.21 
Technical  0.353 16.46 0.345 16.11 0.235 10.35 0.235  10.34 
Clerical  0.262 15.80 0.263 16.03 0.106 5.80  0.107  5.80 
Craft  0.080 2.49 0.093 2.89 0.003 0.09  0.003  0.11 
Services  0.002 0.10 -0.006  -0.27  -0.008 -0.35  -0.008  -0.37 
Operator  0.044 1.83 0.064 2.64 -0.095 -4.10  -0.094  -4.04 
Other  -0.120 -6.13 -0.115 -5.95 -0.148 -7.25  -0.147  -7.21 
Log hours  0.933 51.87 0.920 50.30 0.847 46.51 0.846  46.51 
Works at home  0.139 9.22 0.133 8.88 0.087 5.92  0.088  5.95 
Temporary job  -0.064 -3.37 -0.061 -3.23 -0.063 -3.37  -0.066  -3.52 
Trade union member  0.097 9.66 0.090 8.98 0.074 7.28  0.074  7.26 
< 1 year with current firm  -0.144 -10.73 -0.144 -10.60 -0.129 -10.28 -0.129  -10.27 
1 - 2 years with current firm  -0.118 -8.82 -0.121 -9.12 -0.112 -9.23  -0.112  -9.21 
3 - 5 years with current firm  -0.092 -8.72 -0.092 -8.79 -0.080 -8.30  -0.081  -8.37 
6 - 10 years with current firm  -0.050 -5.15 -0.050 -5.17 -0.037 -4.06  -0.037  -4.08 
Log regional house prices  0.240 10.05 0.243 10.16 0.221 10.50 0.221  10.47 
Unemployment rate (travel-to-work-area)  0.004 1.27 0.004 1.27 0.026 2.97  0.026  2.96 
Agree - Job requires one to work very hard  -  -  0.024 2.48 0.020  2.67 0.020 2.63 
Agree - Not enough time to get job done  -  -  0.011 1.35 0.031  3.20 0.031 3.23 
1-4 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.045 4.19 0.048  5.96 0.047 5.97 
5-10 days of off-the-job training  -  -  0.052 6.08 0.041  4.97 0.042 5.00 
Often asked advice about workplace practices  -  -  0.020 2.24 -0.004 -11.76  -0.004  -11.91 
% of employees working part-time  -  -  - -  0.000  1.37  0.000  1.39 
% of employees who are female  -  -  - -  0.018  1.14  0.018  1.17 
Equal opportunities policy in force  -  -  - -  0.000  2.09  0.000  2.10 
Trade union density at workplace  -  -  - -  0.025  4.76  0.024  4.51 
Log firm size (no. of employees)  -  -  - -  -0.018  -0.71  -0.019  -0.78   45
TABLE A4: (Continued) 
Construction -  -  - -  -0.052  -2.75  -0.051  -2.69 
Wholesale -  -  - -  -0.127  -4.30  -0.127  -4.27 
Hotels and restaurants  -  -  - -  0.002  0.07  0.001  0.04 
Transport -  -  - -  0.023  1.05  0.021  0.96 
Financial -  -  - -  0.032  1.46  0.031  1.41 
Other business  -  -  - -  -0.082  -4.00  -0.082  -4.00 
Education -  -  - -  -0.011  -0.56  -0.012  -0.57 
Health -  -  - -  -0.015  -0.58  -0.015  -0.60 
Other -  -  - -  -0.011  -0.67  -0.011  -0.67 
Single workplace firm  -  -  - -  -0.066  -2.80  -0.066  -2.76 
Owner manager firm  -  -  - -  0.004  0.43  0.004  0.43 
Problem filling vacancies  -  -  - -  -0.010  -3.25  -0.010  -3.19 
% of vacancies filled internally  -  -  - -  -0.001  -0.57  -0.001  -0.57 
% of employees receiving off-the-job training  -  -  - -  -0.001  -0.34  -0.001  -0.37 
% of workdays lost due to absence  - - - -  -0.002  -1.59  -0.002  -1.61 
% of workers having workplace injury  - - - -  -0.053  -0.54  -0.053  -0.54 
Absence information missing  - - - -  -0.012  -0.90  -0.012  -0.88 
Injury information missing  - - - -  0.020  1.77  0.019  1.74 
% of employees <£9,000 per year  -  -  -  -  -0.001 -3.76  -0.001  -3.70 
% of employees >£29,000 per year  -  -  -  -  0.000 4.84  0.000  4.83 
Racial tensions at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  0.007  0.22 
Discrimination at the workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  0.016  0.83 
Bad conditions concerns at workplace  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.013  -0.98 
Agree that your job is secure  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.013  -1.32 
Indifferent about job security  -  -  -  -  - -  -0.019  -1.83 
Log Likelihood  -15642    -15606    -14985    -14982   
Sample  10085    10085    10085    10085   
Notes: The omitted categories are age less than 25, single, no children, free of long-term health condition, no qualifications, sales, does not work 
at home, permanent job, not a trade union member, with current firm more than 10 years, does not agree that 'my job requires that I work very 
hard', does not agree that 'I never seem to have enough time to get my job done', has not undertaken any employer-funded off-the-job training in 
last 12 months, manager does not frequently ask my views about changes to work practices, no equal opportunities policy at the workplace, 
manufacturing sector, multi-workplace firm, no owner manager, no problems filling vacancies in last 12 months, no problems due to racial 
harassment at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to discrimination at the workplace in last 12 months, no problems due to bad 
working conditions at the workplace in last 12 months and disagree with the statement 'I feel my job is secure in this workplace'. '-' means that 
the variable is not included in model. The standard errors have been adjusted for workplace clustering. 